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Response to Francis Oakley
BY KENNETH PENNINGTON +
Professor Francis Oakley has given us a nuanced view of the voluntarist tradition in
late medieval theological thought and has argued that the voluntarist tradition was far
from betraying reason. Natural law in the voluntarist tradition took a step beyond the
Thomistic school by bringing covenant into the discussion. Although he has given us
an abbreviated version of the argument, those who might not be convinced by his
essay here can turn to his other voluminous publications to follow his thought in all its
complexity.' His main contention, however, is unassailable: Christian theological
thought on natural law contains more than one tradition. The voluntarist tradition had
its moral and ethical standards rooted just as firmly in the Christian tradition as in the
Thomistic traditon. Professor Oakley's suggestion, at the end of his paper, that we
might look again at the voluntarist tradition in Islamic thought-with a knowledge of
Arabic-is reasonable. With that said, I would like to consider another aspect of
medieval and early modem thought regarding natural law and morality that, except
among the respondents, is not represented at this conference: the canonistic roots of
natural law, natural rights, justice, ethics, and morality in the Christian tradition.
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First, the voluntarist theological tradition has its roots in canonistic thought.
Professor Oakley knows this but did not mention it because it was not pertinent to his
argument. It has long been known that the work of the leading voluntarist William of
Ockham is not comprehensible without knowledge of medieval canonical
jurisprudence. The first medieval thinker who distinguished between reason and the
will was a canonist named Laurentius Hispanus. Around 1210, he used a phrase from
the Roman satirist Juvenal to describe the relationship of the pope and the law; the
pope, he said, could substitute his legislative will for reason-pro ratione voluntas.
3
However, Laurentius did not imagine an unfettered will, but rather one that had to
conform to the public good-utilitas publica.4 Laurentius' concept of legislative
authority was incorporated into canonical commentaries and became commonplace in
medieval and early modem jurisprudence. 5 When canonists (and theologians) applied
Juvenal's aphorism to God's absolute power, they did not lose sight of its connection
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with reason. It is, therefore, no surprise that Francisco de Vitoria, who was no radical
but rather immersed in the theological and legal traditions, proclaimed in the sixteenth
century: "Divine law is just and is obligatory; it is based on the will of the
Legislator-that is God-since it is pro ratione voluntas." 6  If one does not
understand the rich background and context of Vitoria's thought, his statement could
easily be interpreted as divorcing the divine will from reason.
Second, our modem understanding of natural law is distorted by a shift in the
language used by theologians beginning in the twelfth century. The legal tradition
always used the term ius naturale. Although the term lex naturalis can be found in
early medieval sources, that term was thoroughly rejected by the jurists-influenced
in large part by the terminology they found in Roman law. Christian theologians
began to use the term lex naturalis in late antiquity. Theologians continued to use this
terminology until the twelfth century. 7 By the thirteenth century the worlds of the
jurists and theologians had developed a terminological schism. In the Summa
Theologica, for example, Thomas Aquinas used the term lex naturalis two hundred
and forty-seven times and ius naturale one hundred and seventy-eight times.
8
Aquinas tended to conflate these two terms. However, there is a profound difference
in how these two terms can and were understood in the canonistic tradition. For
jurists, ius meant "law," "right," "justice," and "equity." On the other hand, lex meant
basically what it means today in English: a rule established by a legitimate legislator.
When Pope Benedict XVI drew upon the theological tradition to discuss lex naturalis
in his talk to the International Congress on Natural Moral Law, he tacitly overlooked
a rich canonistic tradition.9 Ius naturale emphasizes rights; lex naturalis imposes
rules.
Gratian was the first jurist to discuss natural law in the canonistic tradition.' 0 He
created what I think is one of the most elegant definitions of ius nautrale in the
European legal tradition. He also shaped the legal discussion of ius naturale for
centuries. Every canonist studied his formulation until 1917. At the beginning of his
Decretum, Gratian asked: What is ius naturale? His answer was lapidary. Ius
naturale, he said, is what is found in the Old and New Testament and is based on a
fundamental principle of Christian thought: "Do unto others as you would have others
do unto you."'" Natural law was based on God's revealed covenant-although
Gratian would not have put it that way, maybe Francis Oakley would. Gratian
concluded by stating ius naturale-which, we must remember, the jurists would
always think of, simultaneously, as a natural law, natural equity, and natural right-
establishing that each person is commanded to do to others what he wants done to
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himself and is prohibited from inflicting on others what he does not want done to
himself.12 Gratian focused on two principles embodied in the word ius-justice and
equity for every human being. The first evidence of Gratian's definition of natural
law being used outside his Decretum is a letter of Pope Innocent I in 1133.'3 Brian
Tierney has shown in convincing detail that later canonists focused on rights
established by natural law as a central tenet of their jurisprudence. 14 It is worth
remembering that when Gratian incorporated Isidore of Seville's definition of ius
naturale just a few paragraphs after his own definition of ius naturale, each of Isidore
definitions was an ius not a lex. 15 The medieval and early modem canonists created a
jurisprudence of ius naturale that embodied principles, not leges-laws, as defined by
the principles of legal positivism. The difference is more than semantic, and it is
profound.
12 Id. at 3.
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